Recent neuropsychological investigations of apraxia have led to new hypotheses about the representational defects associated with imitation impairments in neurological patients. This fMRI experiment investigated the relation between imitation and the body schema in healthy subjects. Experimental conditions were derived from a factorial plan, and participants were asked to watch a human model performing bodily gestures and then to execute either an identical or a different action, with the same or different limbs. Brain areas activated when subjects imitated the model were traced to the representation of the action (main effect of performing an identical action regardless of limb), to the body schema (using the same limb regardless of action), or to both. The first set of analyses yielded a network associated with visual perception, indicating that action representation is primarily visuospatial not motor, while the second analysis highlighted regions involved in body schema including the inferior parietal cortex and the insula. It is suggested that imitation of simple body gestures requires both a visuospatial description of the observed model, sustained by visual perception areas in the right occipitotemporal and superior parietal cortices and a visuospatial description of one's own body, supported by the left inferior parietal lobule. These results favor a model of praxis proposing that imitation deficits in left inferior parietal lobe patients with apraxia reflect primarily an impairment of the body schema, while deficits of praxis in right parietal patients are limited to gestures demanding in terms of visuospatial analysis.
Introduction
The past two decades of research have expanded our knowledge of action imitation at both psychological and neural levels (see Meltzoff & Decety, 2003 for a recent review). There is ample of evidence in experimental psychology favoring a common coding between action and perception in humans (see Viviani, 2002 for a recent review). Neuroscience research has also demonstrated common neural mechanisms between executed and observed action at the neural level. Monkey's ventral premotor area F5 contains mirror neurons that discharge both when a monkey executes a given goal-directed action and when it watches the same action performed by another individual (Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2000) . Similarly, neuroimaging experiments in humans have demonstrated the activation of a fronto-parietal neural network that is involved in the execution, observation and imagination of action (Decety & Chaminade, 2004 ).
An important aspect of the reappraisal of imitation thus requires expanding the knowledge of the brain basis of human imitation and its relationship with this common coding system (Rumiati & Bekkering, 2003; Wilson, 2001) . Of particular interest is the representation of the body in this system (Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996) . Recent theories of imitation have dissected the imitative act into two components, the body part used and the action performed (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997) . Does observation of biological motion and/or of human body parts provide a privileged stimulus for eliciting the activation of action representations? Both aspects have recently been investigated in psychophysics and neuroimaging experiments. Castiello, Lusher, Mari, Edwards, and Humphreys (2002) have explored the nature and specificity of motor priming by examining behavioral responses to actions produced by a robotic arm versus that produced by a human arm. They showed a priming advantage for the latter. A neuroimaging study (Perani et al., 2001 ) demonstrated that perception of real hand object-related actions but not virtual hand actions is associated with inferior parietal activation. It was also shown that biomechanically possi-
